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Calculating matter and recombinant subjects: The infinitesimal and the fractal fold 
Because different mathematical practices are aligned with different ontologies, it 
therefore matters what kind of mathematics we bring to bear in social theory. This paper 
explores the open and urgent question as to whether and how calculation becomes an 
inventive practice that doesn’t simply serve the control society. In search of a non-
axiomatic mathematical problematic, I examine the infinitesimal for its enigmatic role in 
calculation, and show how Deleuze and Guattari use the infinitesimal to (1) rethink the 
relationship between matter and meaning, and (2) describe a recombinant fractal subject 
well suited to our digital times. The infinitesimal is a sort of changeling number with one 
foot in the virtual and one foot in the actual, and thus pivotal to considerations of vitalist 
new mixtures of number and matter.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The social sciences often enlist calculation in controlling rather than creative ways, to 
track and code behavior and predict the movement of human capital. Calculation would 
then be the engine of compliant computational ecologies, ubiquitous computing, and the 
control society. According to this bleak image, number serves an axiomatics rather than a 
problematics, and becomes forever associated with oppressive acts of scientism. But 
mathematics is a rich and diverse field of disparate practices, each entailing radically 
different forms of calculation. Some of these practices are taken up in mainstream 
quantitative methods, and some are not. The particular kind of statistics we have today, 
for instance, and the manner by which it is deployed in the social sciences, is a historical 
contingency. Moreover, in Latour’s words, the way we work with and conceive the 
quantitative has huge impact on social theory - “you have the social theory of your 
statistics” (Latour, 2010, p. 152). 
 
Thus different mathematical practices are aligned with different ontologies, and therefore 
it matters what kind of mathematics we bring to bear in social theory. This paper is very 
much an attempt to imagine how we might do calculation differently, how we might 
distort calculation for new purposes. I search within mathematics for theoretical tools that 
might actually help us do that. My hope is that by exploring problematic rather than 
axiomatic calculation, we can consider the open and urgent question as to whether and 
how calculation becomes an inventive practice that doesn’t simply serve the control 
society. This is a social and political project insofar as I am able to put the mathematical 
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problematic to work in the study of other problems in other fields. Contemporary 
theorists are indeed tapping mathematics as a means of doing philosophy – Gilles 
Deleuze puts topology to work, Alain Badiou set theory, Quentin Meillessoux the 
transfinite, Sha Xin Wei the sheath – and in each case the specific mathematical ideas are 
aligned with particular ontologies. Thus it’s extremely important to look closely at the 
actual mathematical ideas for how they entail a particular ontology. Elsewhere, I have 
explored the politics of the mathematical event (2013) and the dangers of the digital 
superfold (2016), but here I wish to focus carefully on how the mathematics of the 
infinitely small is a potential site for subversive acts of calculation. 
 
My point is that a historical approach to number and calculation reveals a rich field of 
diverse and often subversive mathematical practices, and that each of these practices 
might be taken up in social inquiry with radically different consequences. In the 
seventeenth century, the calculus developed as a radical new method of calculating and 
computing areas and volumes, an inventive method that broke with axiomatic geometry 
and brought with it all sorts of new ways of investigating the world. The early calculus 
relied on the use of infinitesimals - infinitely small continua - to accurately calculate 
various kinds of quantities in problems and applications. Infinitesimals were considered 
blasphemous because their existence entailed a new kind of relationship between number 
and matter that violated the entrenched Aristotelian ontology. They were both continuous 
and yet indivisible in some sense. The infinitesimal of Torricelli and Cavallieri was 
considered so radical that the Jesuits outlawed it in European education institutions. 
Deleuze and Guattari (1987) describe the infinitesimal as always “diabolical” because it 
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undermines the atomism and fixity of individuals, and binds number and matter through 
infinite variation (p. 109). 
 
Questions regarding infinitesimals are highly relevant to our current computational 
practices and calculated publics, where discrete data points proliferate at such high rates 
that the distinction between the discrete and the continuous begins to blur. With rapid 
increase of computational power in the last decades, and the application of recursive 
statistical methods and algorithmic neural nets, vast quantities of discrete data points 
become enmeshed in multi-dimensional continuous manifolds. If one is to measure the 
curvature of such manifolds, one needs a calculus of infinitesimals or differentials. Thus 
contemporary data scientists must merge discrete methods with continuous methods in 
new ways, moving beyond nineteenth and twentieth century parametric methods that 
used modeling and sampling as a kind of predictive analytics, towards new predictive 
methods that moderate the models as the models process data. It’s not that models are no 
longer used, its simply that the models or simulations are themselves dynamic and 
generative, operating less as axiomatic constraints to which data must conform, and 
instead more directly responsive and emergent from within the data set. Recursion plays a 
crucial role in these methods, in part because recursion entails ongoing feed-back loops 
of input-output and thus incorporates a temporal dimension that was lacking in snapshot 
approaches to modeling data: “This makes the expression ‘the behavior of equations’ less 
metaphorical because recursion transforms a static mathematical object into a dynamic 
computational process.” (Delanda, 2011, p.15).  
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These advancements in digital computation trouble our conventional ideas about the 
relationship between the discrete and the continuous; there are two possible speculative 
paths to pursue here: first, what some might consider a more subjective or 
phenomenological approach, claims that at some stage the sheer quantity of data appears 
to us, in our limited perception, to be continuous; the second approach, perhaps a more 
realist approach, is that the data points themselves are infinitesimal continua, and so there 
simply is no such thing as a ‘point’ but instead a founding difference in itself. In this 
second approach, it might be argued that the data points are infinitesimal, or infinitely 
small intervals. Thus the fold rather than the point is the founding action in the universe, 
and all individuation and separation into parts is in fact an infolding or contraction of the 
continuous fabric of life. This perspective demands that we rethink the ontology of the 
data point.  
 
In this paper, I examine the infinitesimal for its enigmatic role in calculation, and show 
how Deleuze and Guattari use the infinitesimal to (1) rethink the relationship between 
matter and meaning, and (2) describe a recombinant fractal subject well suited to our 
digital times. Infinitesimal calculation and singularities are used by Deleuze and Guattari 
to describe the operations of a calculating common matter and a fractal image of life, to 
show how calculation can be machinic but non-axiomatic. They use fractals as monstrous 
calculating devices that transform the concept of measure and multiplicity. Fractals 
occupy fractional dimensional spaces, and thereby break with conventions regarding 
space and embodiment. A fractal recombinant subject no longer abides by the dominant 
image of the organism and phenomenological subjectivity. Chance and algorithm 
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commingle in the fractal subject, opening up the possibility for disruptive acts of 
calculation.  
 
2. The smallest interval is always diabolical 
 
Leibniz used the term infinitesimal to designate the distance between two numbers that 
are infinitely close (Alexander, 2014). Various definitions have emerged over the years – 
perhaps the simplest is that the infinitesimal is an infinitely small interval. This strange 
idea – that an interval could be infinitely small – runs counter to our intuitions about 
intervals as lengths that can always be divided into yet smaller lengths. In what sense 
could an interval be infinitely small? Infinitesimals are like continua “viewed in the 
small” as though one could zoom in and find the ultimate miniscule straight lines that 
composed the macro surfaces that we typically encounter. Others have described the 
infinitesimal as a quantity less than any finite quantity, a quantity that operates beneath 
the finite world. Such quantities don’t play by the usual rules, however, being so small 
that their squares and other powers can be neglected. Perhaps the infinitesimal is an 
intensive magnitude rather than an extensive magnitude, a distinction that plays a pivotal 
role in Deleuze and Guattari’s ontology, as discussed below.  
 
The status and nature of infinitesimals is strongly linked to questions about the nature of 
the ‘mathematical continuum’ which refers to both the geometric number line and the 
real number system that occupies it. Intuitively, if a line is truly continuous, then it seems 
impossible that it be composed of points.These questions relate to the perennial 
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ontological debates about atomism and whether there is some ultimate discrete elemental 
substance that constitutes the universe. Concerns that Euclid’s axioms could not, in 
principle, ensure the continuity of the number line, lead to various attempts to do so in the 
nineteenth century. Dedekind (1831-1916), intent on banishing all geometric “intuition” 
from mathematics, used sets and “cuts” to compose the infinite granularity needed for the 
continuum. Cantor (1845-1918) would offer a similar approach, proposing necessary and 
sufficient conditions for continuity that relied on set theoretic constraints. These attempts 
to discretize the continuity of the number line reveal an awkward haunting. Philosophical 
questions here intersect with mathematical ones: How can a line be constituted from 
points? How can the discrete compose the continuous? If the density of the real numbers 
- the fact that you can always find another real number between any other two - is not 
adequate to ensure that the reals are continuous and without gaps, then perhaps there is 
some smallest element that might fit into these miniscule gaps. What might be the 
conditions by which we can generate the continuous from the discrete? The mathematical 
continuum seems to vibrate with traumatic desire, a desire to be both discrete and 
continuous, counted and uncountable, separate but connected.  
 
I here briefly discuss the history of infinitesimal calculation to help elaborate the 
ontological issues related to the mathematical continuum, and also because it reveals how 
calculation can be radical and operate against the state axiomatic. Infinitesimal 
calculation was revolutionary because of its ontological implications. Aristotle would 
argue against the existence of these infinitesimal ‘indivisibles’; on the other hand, 
Archimedes deployed indivisibles in his computation of areas and volumes in the second 
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century BC. They were called indivisibles because they were considered a kind of 
ultimate element, without discrete parts, that could be used in calculation, and yet they 
were infinitely distortable and indeed continua. In other words, they seemed to be 
changelings that could be used as discrete entities with definitive outlines, and yet open 
to stretching and inflating as need be. Thus their very status seemed to bridge the 
continuous and the discrete, and perplex those who argued for atomism and also those 
who argued against it. Archimedes calculation techniques were taken up and further 
developed in 1600s, during a period of intense mathematical invention in which 
infinitesimal calculation flourished. And yet the very idea of a smallest interval that could 
not be further dissected was indeed the source of many paradoxes. In the 1630s, Jesuit 
fathers in Rome banned the doctrine of infinitesimals, in part because of these paradoxes, 
declaring the idea to be dangerous and subversive, and denouncing those who taught it.  
 
A closer look at the seminal work of Bonaventura Cavalieri (1598-1647) and Evangelista 
Torricelli (1608-1647) in the seventeenth century sheds light on why there was so much 
concern. Torricelli, in particular, created highly accessible treatises and offered “short, 
direct and positive proofs” using infinitesimals (or indivisibles). Unlike Cavailieri, whose 
work was burdened by attempts to avoid paradoxes, Toricelli delved into the paradoxes 
and put them to work in a new kind of calculus. The mathematician and historian Amir 
Alexander (2014) claims that Torricelli “reveled in paradoxes” (p.111) and tapped the 
contradictions that emerged when one assumed the continuum was composed of 
indivisibles, using them as tools for investigation (p.111). “The paradoxes were, in a way, 
Torricelli’s mathematical experiments … For Torricelli, paradoxes … pushed logic to the 
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extreme, thereby revealing the true nature of the continuum, which cannot be accessed by 
normal mathematical means” (Alexander, 2014, p.112). 
 
As a simple example, consider the task of calculating the area of a parallelogram (figure 
#5). We divide the parallelogram into two triangles, and imagine the space of the two 
triangles composed of lines with infinitesimal width (here shown as dotted lines), in one 
triangle they are vertical and the other horizontal. In each case, these infinitesimal lines 
can be added up to determine the area of each triangle.  
 
 
Figure #5 Toricelli and paradox 
 
But if we compare each infinitesimal line in one triangle with a corresponding line in the 
other, we see that the vertical line will always be shorter than the horizontal. Since the 
vertical lines are always shorter than the horizontal to which they are compared, we will 
obtain a contradiction when we sum these to obtain the respective areas of the triangles, 
finding one area to be bigger than the other. Cavalieri tried to avoid paradoxes by not 
allowing indivisibles to be compared that were not parallel. But Torricelli would take up 
this simple paradox and delve into its potential for rethinking the continuum. Indeed, the 
C
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reciprocity in this example, how we move back and forth between the vertical and the 
horizontal (lines of width dx and lines of width dy), will be used to huge advantage.  
 
Torricelli introduced an entirely different way of thinking about composition and argued 
that there was a way that the longer lines could indeed add up to the shorter lines. The 
startling reason he offered contradicted Euclid’s definition of a line. He claimed that the 
short lines are wider than the long lines. In other words, lines are not all without width, 
nor are they all of equal width. The idea that some lines were wider than others was a 
revolutionary idea, and broke with conventional definitions of the line. The same 
proposal was made for indivisible points that might inflate to varying sizes, and 
indivisible planes of varying thickness. It was as if Toricelli was carving out a new virtual 
dimension for these geometric objects, which suddenly allowed them to become flexible 
and malleable. Indivisibles became infinitely variable, and an infinitary calculus was 
born. This controversial move allowed one to calculate various measures that had never 
before been attempted, extending mathematics reach and relevance, and re-assembling 
the relationship between mathematics and matter. If lines had infinitesimal width and 
planes had infinitesimal thickness, then geometry engaged with matter in new ways. 
Despite their awkward ontological status, people began to use infinitesimals in their 
calculations, calling them “linelets” and “timelets” and “evanescent quantities” and 
“inassignable quantities”.  
 
Concerns over their ontological status, however, would eventually lead to a theory of 
limits that would attempt to rid mathematics of actually infinite small quantities. But 
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there have always been advocates for infinitesimals, and they continue to be of interest 
today. In the nineteenth century, for instance, the mathematician Paul du Bois-Reymond 
(1831-1889) argued on their behalf, stating, “The proposition that the number of points of 
division of the unit length is infinitely large produces with logical necessity the belief in 
the infinitely small.” He advocated for a geometric number line composed of points and 
infinitesimal intervals. Charles Dodgson and Charles Peirce were also advocates for the 
infinitesimal. For Peirce, a continuous line contained no points, only continuous 
infinitesimal intervals. Wherever a point occurs, claimed Peirce, that point “interrupts the 
continuity” (CP 6.168). For Peirce, infinitesimals could be used for measurement without 
disrupting continuity. In other words, infinitesimals were measurements intrinsic to the 
continuous entity, and thus they avoided the perennial concern that measures of the 
continuous were always imposed from without. Infinitesimals were a “continuity-
preserving method of measurement” (Buckley, 2012, p. 149). Peirce’s insights seem to 
reflect that of the mathematician Bernhardt Riemann’s approach to measure and 
manifolds, an approach that was used by Einstein to develop special relativity theory, and 
used by others to develop contemporary topology, which now plays a central role in the 
study of big data. The infinitesimal was finally given formal legitimacy (aside from its 
evident pragmatic value) in the 1960s when the mathematician Abraham Robinson 
produced a powerful and coherent foundation for the hypereal numbers, which 
incorporated infinitesimals, transfinite numbers and the real numbers in one system.  
 
3. Intensive calculating matter 
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The infinitesimal is a way of studying the involvement of the infinite in the finite, and an 
important way of calculating with rather than on a continuum. The infinitesimal is a sort 
of changeling with one foot in the virtual and one foot in the actual. Deleuze and Guattari 
(1987) tap into the infinitesimal as the calculating engine of their ontology, a means of 
differentiating the mathematical continuum and tapping its singularities, which they take 
to be the generative and immanent dark precursors of life. We can see this at work in 
Deleuze’s discussion of the diagram that Leibniz produced as a way of arguing on behalf 
of infinitesimals. Leibniz used a similar triangle diagram, where a triangle with sides of 
finite length is similar to a triangle with sides of infinitesimal lengths (y and e in figure 
#2).  
 
 
Figure #2: Leibniz and the infinitesimal triangle 
 
This diagram is used to argue that the “vanishing difference” or differential (offspring of 
the infinitesimal) remains “perfectly determined” and yet unassignable (Smith, 2012, 
p.52). Similar triangles are used extensively in the early mathematical papers of Leibniz, 
precisely because they allow one to set up a correspondence between the ratios of sides in 
two triangles, and thus allow one to conjoin the vanishing segments of the infinitesimal 
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triangle with the finite sides of another triangle. For Deleuze and Guattari (1987), 
however, this correspondence or similarity, is not simply an analogy between the infinite 
and the finite, for that would force us to always speak of qualities that are eminent rather 
than immanent. Analogy or congruence by proportionality (similarity) fails to capture the 
conjoining of finite and infinitesimal triangles; it follows that the mathematical similarity 
between finite and infinitesimal triangles is not an analogy. Infinitesimal triangle 
similarity is actually a calculating device - a means of calculating with infinitesimals, 
rather than an image that reflects the infinite in the finite. This distinction is crucial, 
underscoring how the infinitesimal triangle is not reflected in the finite triangle, nor 
represented by the finite triangle, but instead fully coupled with the finite triangle. 
Deleuze and Guattari (1987) describe the infinitesimal as that “intense matter” and 
“continuum of variation” that conjugates content and expression in “reciprocal 
presupposition” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 108-109). They describe the infinitesimal 
as that which quivers between two different kinds of difference, joining these differences 
together in the continuum. The infinitesimal becomes the reciprocal presupposition that 
conjugates degrees of difference. I am arguing that the infinitesimal is pivotal in Deleuze 
and Guattari’s ontology because it does the structuring work that is needed. In other 
words, infinitesimal calculation is an engine of structuration within their ontology of 
immanence – it produces and sustains structures within matter.   
 
For the purposes of this paper, my interest is in how this infinitesimal calculation 
produces for Deleuze and Guattari “a matter more immediate, more fluid, and more 
ardent than bodies or words” where the distinctions are held in conjunction (Deleuze and 
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Guattari, 1987, p.109). Deleuze and Guattari go on to call this a “single matter” or 
“common matter” where “… differences, now infinitely small, are constituted in single 
matter serving both for expression, as incorporeal power, and for content as limitless 
corporeality” (p.109).  The infinitesimal conjoins these as a “liberated matter” of speeds 
and tensors that spell the end of form. They say, “the moment this conjunction occurs, 
there is a common matter.” (p. 109). Throughout Thousand Plateaus, they use the term 
“reciprocal presupposition” to describe this conjoining of expression and content, this 
sustaining of a common matter. Rather than simply see this key theoretical term as 
emphasizing the provisional relationship between content and expression, I argue here 
that the notion of the infinitesimal is pivotal to understanding this term. It is through the 
process of calculating with infinitely small quantities that this reciprocal presupposition 
is achieved. This is crucial to their ontology, and as this reciprocity becomes iterative and 
recursive, mathematical intensities and biological intensities are fused.  
 
We see here the prospect of a calculating matter and non-human number sense, keeping 
in mind that this imaginary offers both an image of dystopic control societies but also 
vitalist new mixtures of number and matter. And yet any proposal of a ‘calculating 
matter’ must face deeply ethical questions, which grapple with how the autonomy of such 
calculating matter might supersede the autonomy of the human subject. As Kirby (2011) 
asks: “How should we understand epistemology in such an instance where calculation is 
an ontologizing process of mutation?” (p.41). If social inquiry has conventionally focused 
on the human body as that which acquires knowledge and develops skills, then the turn to 
calculating matter dethrones this body. Kirby (2011) suggests we consider carnality as 
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“calculating and thinking material through and through” so much so that the very nature 
of corporeality is “to mathematize, represent, or intelligently take measure of itself.” 
(p.63). In other words, we are asked to imagine the non-human dimension of measure, an 
“evolving and implicate calculation”, an “ontologizing process of mutation” (p.66, p.41). 
Such a suggestion seems too dangerous to pose in the midst of calculated publics and 
governing algorithms and smart environments that track our every move. Consider, for 
instance, research in the learning sciences that explores how to use eye-tracking and 
emotion recognition software to improve student learning from online gaming 
environments. And yet surely such ubiquitous computing points to the urgent need to 
directly confront Kirby’s suggestion, and to develop philosophical insight into the 
manner of this ontological turn. 
 
Deleuze and Guattari (1987) describe two different kinds of number, one operating in 
smooth spaces and the other in striated spaces. The terms smooth and striated are used to 
designate two political terrains - a striated surface curtails movement and freedom, while 
a smooth surface allows for divergent or aberrant movement. The state uses number to 
striate smooth space, to count and sort and measure in such a way that there is exclusion 
and inclusion. My proposal is that more inventive kinds of number and mathematics are 
able to flourish in smooth spaces. The smooth of smooth space is a reference to 
mathematical work in the 1970s that used the infinitesimal to develop a synthetic 
differential geometry and a smooth infinitesimal analysis (Zalamea, 2012). Part of this 
work involved the mathematician F.W. Lawvere who introduced the idea of “nilpotent 
infinitesimals” - quantities so small that one of their powers vanishes – to develop the 
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highly influential smooth infinitesimal analysis that deployed them as intensive 
magnitudes in the form of infinitesimal tangent vectors to curves (Bell, 2014).  
 
For Deleuze and Guattari (1987), smooth space is no guarantee of inventive calculation. 
The state also “reimparts smooth in the wake of the striated” in order to pursue global 
multi-national and military-industrial interests (p. 385). In other words, there is an 
apparent smoothness to the control society of which we must be suspicious and critical. 
The challenge is to know how to recognize smooth spaces that are truly smooth! In other 
words, the challenge is to better understand the nature of continua. The smooth does not 
have an “irresistible revolutionary calling” and its tactics change meaning depending on 
the concrete conditions by which they are pursued. Nonetheless, Deleuze and Guattari 
point to ways in which revolutionary rather than controlling smoothness might be 
recognized. They do so by contrasting state or major geometry with nomadic arithmetic, 
not because the nomads do arithmetic, but because “algebra and arithmetic arise in a 
strongly nomad influenced world.” (p.388). In other words, arithmetic has a revolutionary 
potential in contrast to geometry, where geometry is taken to be the art of measurement 
and arithmetic is the art of ordinal iteration. Geometry lends itself to the control of space, 
and through geometry the state territorializes number, but there is also an “independence 
or autonomy of the Number” that subverts this kind of spatial striation (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1987, p. 389). They use the term “the numbering number” to describe this 
“autonomous arithmetic organization”. Like Torricelli’s revolutionary use of 
infinitesimals, the numbering number breaks with geometric control because of its 
“capacity to have multiple and incommensurable bases”: 
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The Numbering Number, in other words, autonomous, arithmetic, organization, 
implies neither a superior degree of abstraction nor very large quantities … 
These numbers appear as soon as one distributes something in space, instead of 
dividing up space or distributing space itself … The number is no longer a 
means of counting or measuring but of moving: it is the number itself that 
moves through space … The numbering number is rhythmic, not harmonic 
(Deleuze &Guattari, 1987, p. 389-390).  
 
This idea of “distributing number in space, instead of dividing up space” evokes a new 
kind of ordinality. Deleuze (1988) will claim that the term numbering number is used by 
Bergson to describe how “difference itself has a number, a virtual number, a sort of 
numbering number” (Deleuze, 1988, p. 44). It is in this way that number becomes the 
“mobile occupant”, “ambulant fire”, the “directional number” all of which are different 
ways to point to the ordinality of number. When the ordinal becomes iterational (or 
rather, when we tap into the iterative dimension of the ordinal in recursion), a new kind 
of calculation emerges. The concept of the fractal became increasingly important in 
Guattari’s writing on chaosmosis, where various processes of fractalization figure 
prominently in thinking the socio-political subject. It’s important to keep in mind, as we 
discuss these abstract terms smooth and striated, that they are terrains that produce very 
different kinds of political subjects. In A thousand Plateaus, in the chapter on smooth and 
striated space, Deleuze and Guattari mention the Koch snowflake and the Sierpensky 
sponge as examples of smooth spaces insofar as they pursue a fractional dimension, 
somewhere between line and plane, or between plane and solid. Any space with a 
fractional dimension escapes conventional measures and is “the index of a properly 
directional space”. In other words, the dimensionality of a smooth space is determined by 
that which moves through it, rather than by some magnitude of containment. For my 
 19 
purposes today, I want to emphasize how ordinality is associated with smooth space, and 
cardinality with striated space. This is an ordinality that is inflected by chance and 
recursion. It is through the iterative mobile calculating of a space-filling fractal, like the 
Hilbert curve, that a line can fill a plane without ceasing to be a line (figure #3).  
 
 
Figure #3: Six iterations of Hilbert’s fractal 
 
This is a crucial aspect of a smooth space – that it “does not have a dimension higher than 
that which moves through it or is inscribed in it.” (Deleuze &Guattari, 1987, p. 488). This 
is how number resists the containment of the cardinal, which is that dimension of number 
that perceives the individuation of the discrete. Indeed, a condition for smooth space will 
be what they call this “numbering number” which achieves a mobile occupying without 
whole number counting.  Striation will be an approach to number that is “exclusively 
cardinal in character”, while the “ordinal, directional, nomadic, articulated number, the 
numbering number” produces degrees of freedom within a smooth space. This number is 
ordinal in terms of how it brings forth the new, with each count, rather than establishing 
the size or metric of a set. This is an ordinal inflected with chance and recursion. Fractals 
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pursue this recursive directional number – monstrous calculations of this kind are another 
example of how calculation becomes monstrous and revolutionary. Massumi declares 
“The “plane” of Life itself … is a “space-filling fractal” of infinite dimension.” 
(Massumi, 1992, p. 23).  
 
With the fractal we see a new kind of commingling of the continuous fold and the 
discrete. Just as the fold was used by Deleuze to describe the Baroque subject, the 
“superfold” or overfold is used to describe the current recombinant subject (Galloway, 
2014, p. 108). The dividual (rather than the individual) and the superfold are the key 
tropes of this new era, which is still a folding monist topology, but stretched and twisted 
into entirely new relationships. The difference between the fold and the superfold is that 
the latter incorporates the digital. Leibniz’ fold is “the smallest element of the labyrinth” 
and more fundamental than the point (Deleuze, 1992, p.6). But the “superfold” is a 
combinatorial iteration achieved in the kinds of genetic repetition we see in the double 
helix, where chance and algorithm commingle. The Baroque subject was pleated into 
matter, but the post-phenomenological dividual is a recombinant subject, assembling 
always in relation to a calculating bioinformatic ecosystem.  
 
Deleuze and Guattari argue that calculation is not simply imposed on us from without, 
but instead we are computational everywhere, from RNA recombination to markets to 
digesting stomachs to degrees of affect. But Deleuze (1989) reminds us that there are at 
minimum two kinds of automata – the first is the “great spiritual automaton” which 
pursues the highest exercise of thought, while the second is the “psychological 
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automaton” who is “dispossessed of his own thought” (p. 263). In the first case, automata 
is lived as immanence. In the second case, it serves the control society and its reliance on 
a phenomenological (sensory-motor) image of the body. In the first case, we follow a will 
to art that breaks with a phenomenology of the human body as the administrator of all its 
participation. This encounter serves a non-human will to art, “aspiring to deploy itself 
through involuntary movements”, but always risking new methods that may destroy that 
same will (Deleuze, 1989, p. 266). Such artful automatism recalls Surrealist automatic 
writing in which the hand becomes a conduit for non-human forces. But rather than see 
automatism as a conduit or form of communication between the human and the non-
human, this is an automatism that is pure immanence, entirely non-representational and 
non-communicative. The challenge is to imagine a calculation that operates without 
representation. How might an iterative but creative calculation be immanent within 
matter? Can we explore a number ‘sense’ that belongs to matter in this way? Can we 
imagine a computation that escapes the logic of resemblance, correspondence, exchange, 
remainder? These questions about number are precisely those that haunt a philosophy of 
immanence. 
 
4. Singularities and intensive disjunctions 
 
Singularities are remarkable points or attractors that structure a space of possibility. 
Although singularities are often considered points of discontinuity, this would 
misrepresent them. They are structuring devices in dynamic systems, acting like 
attractors that influence the flow within the system. Poincaré proposed four kinds of 
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singularities -  the nodes, saddle points, foci and centers (figure #4) – but in higher 
dimensions and in periodic systems there are more (Delanda, 2011).  
 
 
Figure #4 Poincaré’s singularities 
 
Ontological questions about the nature and existence of topological singularities are 
relevant to our discussion. As Delanda (2011) asks of singularities: “Do they exist, for 
example, as transcendent entities in a world beyond that of matter and energy? Or are 
they immanent to the material world? If all the matter and energy of the universe ceased 
to exist, would singularities also disappear (immanent) or would they continue to exist 
(transcendent)? Although these questions are not mathematical but philosophical the 
practice of mathematicians can still provide insights into the answers.” (p.20)  
 
The Koch snowflake (figure #5) is an example of a curve that is everywhere continuous 
but nowhere differentiable because it is dense with singularities. To generate the Koch 
snowflake, start with a triangle, then divide its sides (see figure #5), then repeat the same 
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division to the edges of the star, and keep repeating indefinitely. Such a curve would be 
smooth in one sense – in being a curve – but its curvature so jagged that there would be 
no way to track its abrupt changes.  
 
 
Figure #5: Koch snowflake 
 
Paradoxically, the perimeter becomes infinite while the area within remains finite. The 
Koch snowflake is known as a mathematical monster because it refuses to cater to our 
expectations about measure. The singularities along the perimeter proliferate and saturate 
the curve. Many mathematical monsters are generated in this recursive way. This 
insistent iterative process of becoming unmanageable through repetition transforms 
thought itself as one pursues the fractal fold. These singularities are Deleuze’s 
“impersonal and pre-individual nomadic singularities” that constitute the transcendental 
field on which one pursues a transcendental empiricism (Deleuze, 1990, p. 109). These 
singularities are not copied or imprinted in the empirical field, but are forces that sustain 
it. They are the immanent intensive discontinuities in Deleuze’s ontology. As Delanda 
(2011) suggests, singularities are the structuring devices within an immanent ontology.  
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Fractal geometry is an example of how singularities can create structures that break with 
conventional measures. This example is directly linked to my opening comments about 
computational ecologies, since fractal geometry emerged in consort with new 
computational technologies – as well as less impressive but pivotal enabling 
technologies, like the dot-matrix printer. Benoit Mandelbrot developed the field in the 
1980s and was awarded the Barnard Medal for Meritorious Service to Science, where the 
judges celebrated this method: “In the great tradition of philosophers past, you looked at 
the world around you on a broader canvas”(Samuel, 2012, p. 21).  
 
Although Mandelbrot was not a programmer, he relied on computers to study the fractal 
folding of chance-inflected algorithms, and the possibility of space-filling curves and 
other oddities. The media theorist Sha Xin Wei (2013) suggests that computation is 
actually a process of crenulation and foliation, and thus part of the ontogenetic folding of 
matter rather than something imposed on it from without. One might interpret this as the 
claim that number is pre-given in matter, but not, Wei suggests, as a static and finished 
concept, unable to partake in becoming imperceptible. Wei follows Deleuze in focusing 
on the virtual dimension of matter, which he describes as an inherent potentiality. He 
emphasizes how media are alive with dueling “parameters” that can be modulated to 
create odd monsters, like the snowflake, where complexity in form increases through the 
iterative folding of an environment that is inherently mathematical. He suggests that the 
monsters of measure theory “hint at an infinitely richer mathematical ontology ever more 
prolific than the present imaginary” (p.140). He encourages us to consider how the 
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recursive process that generates the snowflake is a folding process, and each iteration or 
count is never fully disconnected from its past and future iterations. 
 
Fractals give us a glimpse into how calculation can be machinic but non-axiomatic. And 
the result is a kind of monstrous continuity, where the geometric line is bent and creased 
an infinite number of times, a continuity oddly sustained by these intensive disjunctions 
where the crease occurs. Repeated creases are like counts, but not discrete in the typical 
sense, discussed at the outset of this paper. These are disjunctions that are not entirely 
individuated or divided into separate parts. The interest for Deleuze is when disjunction is 
a “veritable synthesis”, that is, when the fractal creasing and production of singularities 
produces something an affirmation of the new (and not simply a conjunction of the 
many). Only through such dogged repetition do we arrive at the conditions that Deleuze 
(1990) seeks when he states: “the whole question, and rightly so, is to know under what 
conditions the disjunction is a veritable synthesis … The answer is given insofar as the 
divergence or the decentering determined by the disjunction become objects of 
affirmation as such. The disjunction is not at all reduced to a conjunction; it is left as a 
disjunction, since it bears, and continues to bear, upon a divergence as such.” (my italics, 
p.199). My argument here is that singularities are disjunctive connectors. 
 
In Deleuze and Guattari’s work, we begin to get a sense of a lively mathematical 
ontology, where multiplicity is reconceived through singularities and infinitesimals that 
can structure the space as either smooth or striated. Thus when we speak of a calculating 
matter that exhibits structure, Deleuze invites us to try and think of the structure of the 
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Koch snowflake and its distribution of singularities and differentials, to imagine 
calculating machines that might be generative of smooth spaces. And he suggests, 
unapologetically, that we become machinists or operators of this kind of structure. In his 
essay “How do we recognize structuralism?” he states: 
 
Every structure presents the following two aspects: a system of differential 
relations according to which the symbolic elements determine themselves 
reciprocally, and a system of singularities corresponding to these relations and 
tracing the space of the structure.” (Deleuze, 2004, p. 177).   
 
Thus the singularity and the infinitesimal (or differential) are the two structuring devices 
in this immanent ontology. In each case, they are capable of pursuing a wild and 
monstrous form of calculation that breaks with the axiomatic use of calculation. Of 
course, infinitesimals and singularities are also part of mainstream mathematics, and can 
be deployed in completely mundane ways, or in ways that shut down revolutionary 
thought. As Deleuze and Guattari (1987) remind us, there is no guarantee that smooth 
space will become the site of revolution.   
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Deleuze and Guattari draw on the infinitesimal and the singularity to write against the 
dominant conceptions of the subject as found in phenomenology. If at the center of 
phenomenology is the human organism for whom the world unfolds continuously, then 
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the Koch snowflake offers a digital mutation of this fold, affirming a recombinant subject 
produced through a fractal fold which changes so radically at imperceptible scales that 
competing measures fail to agree. Perhaps the Koch snowflake captures the fractal shape-
shifting of the calculated and calculating dividual of contemporary digital culture. 
Perhaps fractal methodologies of various kinds can be taken up and used in the study of 
contemporary spaces and subjects.  
 
The ordinal plays a pivotal role in Deleuze’s ontology – in fact singularities are 
determined through an infinite series that is inherently ordinal in its unfolding. But this 
ordinality is not simply an ordered prescription of next, next, next. This is an ordinal 
that has incorporated chance and recursion into each act of counting. For Deleuze, 
smooth space is constituted “bit by bit as an order of proximity, in which the notion of 
proximity first of all has precisely an ordinal sense and not a signification in 
extension” (Deleuze, 2004, my italics, p. 174). If the Koch snowflake captures the 
fractal nature of becoming, it does so through an affirmation of the power of the 
recursive ordinal.  
 
In this paper I’ve explored the idea of calculating matter and recombinant subjects. I’ve 
examined the role of the infinitesimal and the singularity as sites of numeric calculation 
that are ultimately indifferent to human endeavor. Mathematics is put to work in many 
different ways in Deleuze and Guattari’s work, but their philosophy of immanence 
depends on an infinitesimal calculation that expresses the “reciprocal immanence” or 
“mutual immanence” of matter and the infinite. As Deleuze (1978-1981) states, in his 
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lectures on Spinoza, the “individual is a relation insofar as every relation is a measure, 
and insofar as every measure plunges into the infinite.” That dangerous plunge entails an 
immersion in the ontology of infinitesimals and singularities.   
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